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The Development of the Securities
Market and Regulation in China
YUWA WEI*

I. INTRODUCTION

Since China's economic reforms, securities activities have
reappeared in China. In 1986, John Phelan, Chairman of the Board
of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), presented the emblem
of the NYSE as a gift to the then President of China, Deng
Xiaoping. In return, the President of the Bank of China gave Mr.
Phelan the first green-colored stock certificate in the history of the
People's Republic of China, the stock of the Shanghai Feile
Acoustics Company. In fact, the stock of the Shanghai Feile
Acoustics Company was first issued in 1984.' Excited, Mr. Phelan
requested a visit to the first stock exchange in China. Mr. Phelan
had a positive first impression of the Shanghai Jingan Stock
Exchange, a room of about eleven square meters located in a
building on Nanjing Xilu Road in Shanghai. Mr. Phelan
commented that the Shanghai Jingan, in its nascency, was superior
to the NYSE due to the fact that the initial transactions of the
NYSE were completed under a tree.2
Since Mr. Phelan's first visit, China has not only established
two national stock exchanges, but the trading value of the stock
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1. ZHONG CHEN, WIND AND CLOUD ON THE SECURITIES MARKETS IN CHINA 91
(2d ed. 2000).
2. Id. at 92.
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exchanges accounts for fifty percent of China's GDP.' As a result
of China's entry into the WTO, its securities market has opened
further to foreign investors. China's securities market has caught
worldwide attention.
This Article investigates the role of the securities market in
relation to corporate governance, and examines how the Chinese
utilize the monitoring functions of the securities market to upgrade
their corporate governance systems. This Article also explores
other influential securities markets, and provides a comparative
discussion on the securities regulations and practice in these
systems.
Part II investigates the theoretical aspects of the securities
market and its regulations. It examines the important role played
by the securities market in the economy, and its value-creating
capacity function. This section illustrates the rationalities behind
the development of the securities market, and then analyses its
significant supervisory function over the management of listed
companies.
Part III traces the tortuous path of the development of the
securities market in China. In doing so, it also compares securities
laws and practices in leading economies such as the United States,
the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. In addition, this
section demonstrates that the development of the securities
market and regulation is shaped by the particular social, political,
and economic circumstances of a particular country.
Part IV analyses the characteristics and identifies the
problems of securities laws and practices in China. This Section
draws a comparison between China's situation and the situations
of mature markets, and suggests that China needs to further
promote the banks' role in corporate finance.
Part V concludes that China's securities market has come into
a crucial stage of development. Designing a securities regime in
China is an uphill task. China must reduce government
intervention for the market to operate under market rules.
Additionally, China should develop a securities regime that
combines the strengths of the market-based approach and the
bank-based approach.

3. By September 2001, trading value of the stock exchanges accounted for 51.26 %
of China's

GDP. See JIN DEHUAN,

A STUDY

SECURITIES MARKET AND CONTROL 4 (2003).

OF VOLATILITY

OF THE

CHINESE
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II. A MEANS OF CORPORATE FINANCE AND AN EXTERNAL
MECHANISM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The Chinese government has been motivated by three major
objectives in developing a securities market: (1) encourage
securities investments and mitigate the lack of capital resources
faced by many Chinese enterprises; (2) maximize employment of
idle capital; and (3) establish a modern corporate governance
system in listed companies.! Unlike some developed countries,
China attaches great importance to the monitoring function of the
securities market over the management of listed companies In
fact, using the securities market as leverage to speed-up the
process of building a modern corporate governance system has
been an important reform strategy of the Chinese government.6
The expectations of the Chinese are based on the two fundamental
functions of the securities market: corporate finance and corporate
governance.7 This section will examine these two functions in turn.
In a highly competitive
commercial environment,
corporations race for survival. In this race, large corporations have
a better chance of surviving.8 This is because the expansion of
4. See generally Daniel M. Anderson, Taking stock in China: Company disclosure
and information in China'sstock markets, GEO. L.J. (Jun. 2000).
5. Stephen C. Thomas & Chen Ji, Privatizing China: The Stock Markets and Their
Role in Corporate Reform, 58 China Bus. Rev. (July 1, 2004) (book review) (2004 WLNR
11626777).
6. The author of this article had interesting discussions with the staff members of
China Securities Regulatory Commission and Hong Kong Stock Exchange during
conferences in 2001 and 2003. The staff members clarified that by encouraging statecontrolled companies to be listed on stock exchanges, the Chinese government hoped that
these companies would accelerate the process of modernizing their management and
promoting the practice of good corporate governance. They further pointed out that these
state-controlled companies have state banks to be their financiers and their main purpose
of going public was not raising funds from the securities market. See Yuwa Wei, The Role
of China Securities Regulatory Commission in Corporate Law Reforms and Corporate
Governance, Paper Presented at the DEST (CHESI) Melbourne Conference: Corporate
Governance in Post WTO China, 11 passim (Dec. 5-6, 2003) (on file with author).
(manuscript presented at the International Conference on Corporate Governance in PostVVTO Entry China, Melbourne, Dec.2003).
7. Xiao Geng, China's Securities Market Development: Lessons from Hong Kong
and
Other
Asian
Markets
1,
3
(Jan.
15,
2003)
at
http://www.econ.hku.hk/-xiaogeng/research/Paper/Securities%20market%2Odevelopment
%20in%20China-English.pdf (discussing the role of the stock market in company finance
and governance); see also Yuwa Wei, Seeking a Practicable Chinese Model of Corporate
Governance,10 MICH. ST. U.-DSL J. INT'L. L. 393, 426 (2002) (asserting that China
benefited from the monitoring function of the securities market).
8. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF
INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 8, 953-56 (1990) (stating that large manufacturing companies
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business scales can reduce unit costs and increase the total longrun profits.' Also, large-scale corporations have the advantage of
attracting top managerial talents and skilled workers."
Corporations must grow." Consequently, they must expand their
business scale and scope to increase their total long-run profits. To
facilitate this growth, corporations need funds which
energized the
12
worldwide.
Market
Securities
the
of
development
The security market is a place where corporations and
individuals buy and sell securities. For corporations, issuing
securities on a stock exchange is an important means of raising
funds. 3 Alternatively, a corporation could also directly borrow
funds from financial institutions, or issue shares and debentures to
specific investors. Such financial arrangements, however, have
limits. For example, bank loans would burden companies with high
interest costs. Moreover, it is difficult to find specific investors
when the amount of funds needed is extensive. Consequently,
raising funds from the general public becomes a crucial means of
boosting corporate finance.
The securities market and banks played important roles at
every stage of corporate development, from the early joint stock
companies to modern public listing companies, and from early
railway, shipping, and mining industries to our modern aviation,
space, and information technology industries." In common law
systems, the rise of the corporate economy relied on attracting and

enjoyed powerful competitive advantages).
9. Id. at 953.
10. James C. Cooper & Kathleen Madigan Small Isn't Beautiful When Skills are
Scarce Business Week: Enterprise Online (Oct. 2, 1995), at http://www.businessweek.net/
1995/40/b3444129.htm.
11. See EDITH T. PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM 30 (1980)
("[G]rowth and profits become equivalent as the criteria for the selection of investment
programs. Firms will never invest in expansion for the sake of growth if the return on the
investment is negative, for that would be self-defeating. Firms will never invest outside the
firm except eventually to increase the funds available for investment in the firm. To
increase total long-run profits of the enterprise in the sense discussed here is therefore
equivalent to increasing the long-run rate of growth. Hence, it does not matter whether we
speak of 'growth' or 'profits' as the goal of a firm's investment activities.").
12. See generally EVICTOR MORGAN & W.A. THOMAS, THE STOCK EXCHANGE: ITS
HISTORY AND FUNCTIONS (1969).
13. JAMES D. COX, ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 2

(3rd ed. 2001).
14. See E. VICTOR MORGAN & W.A. THOMAS, THE STOCK EXCHANGE: ITS

HISTORY AND FUNCTIONS (2nd ed. 1969) (tracing the history of the stock exchange and
its huge expansion since 1914).
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utilizing public investments."
The securities market not only enables corporations to raise
capital from a wide range of investors, but the securities market
also acts as a monitoring mechanism over the management of
corporations. 6 This is because share prices closely reflect the
managerial efficiency of corporations." Specifically, investors are
reluctant to invest in a poorly managed company. As a result, the
share prices of poorly managed companies are likely to go down,
thereby exposing these companies as targets for takeovers. The
threat of takeover acts as a deterrent that obliges the board and
management to act in the interests of the corporation.8 In the
meantime, the benefits of being listed on a stock exchange provide
incentives for corporations to actively improve their economic and
managerial efficiency to satisfy the listing requirements of stock
exchanges. 9
The securities market is subject to rigorous regulation
because of its profit-making function.' Over time, the securities
market experienced eras of free trade, regulation, and
deregulation. Initially, the securities market was basically
unregulated, which led to a series of crises and scandals.2' For
instance, the burst of the South Sea Bubble in the early 18th
century caused the collapse of the entire financial market in the
United Kingdom.2 In the United States, the failure of the
15. See MORGAN & THOMAS, supra note 14.
16. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 323 (1976) (arguing

the stock market could control management through monitoring).
17. See generally id.; R. Ian McEwin, Law and Economics as an Approach to
Corporate Law Research, 3 CANBERRA L. REV. 40, 41 (1996); WILLIAM J. BAUMOL &
ALAN BLINDER, ECONOMICS, PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 647 (1988).
18. Thomas Lee Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment
Theory: Implications for Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70 N.C.L.

Rev. 137, 182 (1991) (discussing how the threat of takeover keeps management focused on
its value-maximizing function).
19. See Paul Marsh, Market Assessment of Company Performance, in CAPITAL
MARKETS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 67 (Nicholas Dimsdale and Martha Prevezer

eds. 1994). See also Colin Mayer, Stock-markets, Financial Institutions, and Corporate
Performance, in CAPITAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 179 (Nicholas

Dimsdale and Martha Prevezer eds. 1994).
20.

See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 8 (3rd ed.

1996).
21. Id. at 6.
22. See LEWIS MELVILLE, THE SOUTH SEA Bubble-vii (1921) (threatening the nation
with political and social ruin); PETER GEORGE MUIR DICKSON, THE FINANCIAL
REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND (1967).
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securities market added further devastation to the economic
depression in the 1930s.2 Following these failures, rules and
regulations were introduced to make the securities market a fair
and orderly place for public investments. ' Now, in a fair and
orderly securities market, investors are reasonably informed and
the market has the ability to assess the performance of public
companies, and supervise their management.'
In summary, the securities market has the following functions:
(1) it provides a mechanism for companies to sell securities in
order to finance corporate expansion; (2) it provides a means for
investors to buy and sell their outstanding shares; (3) it establishes
share prices that assist in monitoring firms and allocating
resources; (4) it encourages risk-taking by spreading risks and
rewarding profitable investment; and (5) through corporate
control, it allows managerial failure to be corrected through its
markets.26
In a well-functioning securities market, companies can raise
new funds and investors can buy and sell outstanding securities at
a fair price.' However, there have always been doubts on the
efficiency of the securities market in pricing its securities. Indeed,
there has been evidence of mis-pricing.' Otherwise, the securities
market is efficient. 9 Furthermore, improving financial reporting,
disclosure, and quality of investment analysis could improve
efficiency.' As a result, investors are still confident enough to
invest in securities.

23. See

JOHN P. CASKEY, THE

EVOLUTION

OF THE

PHILADELPHIA

STOCK

EXCHANGE: 1964-2002 8 (Research Dep't, Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Working Paper

No. 03-21, 2003).
24. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION
34, 36 (5th ed. 2004) (discussing the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of
1934).
25. See Arthur R. Pinto, The United States, in THE LEGAL BASIS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS 253, 258 (Arthur R. Pinto & Gustavo
Visentini eds., 1998); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for

CorporateControl, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9 (1980).
26. Colin Mayer, Stock-markets, FinancialInstitutions,and CorporatePerformance,in
CAPITAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 179 (Nicholas Dimsdale & Martha
Prevezer eds., 1994); Paul Marsh, Market Assessment of Company Performance, in
CAPITAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 66, 67 (Nicholas Dimsdale &
Martha Prevezer eds. 1994).
27. Marsh, supra note 26, at 67.
28. Marsh, supra note 26, at 69-70.

29. See id.
30. See Marsh, supra note 26, at 84-90.
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A well-functioning securities market also acts as an important
mechanism for corporate governance in public companies.3" It
encourages public companies to improve managerial efficiency and
correct managerial failure in order to be admitted into a stock
exchange and maintain their profiles.32 This is because companies
must comply with the listing rules of the stock exchange.33 Also,
once there, the share price of a company reflects the managerial
efficiency of the company.' Because of the low share price, a
poorly managed company faces the threat of takeover. A takeover
inevitably replaces the under-performing management team.3
Hence, takeovers contribute to the governance process in two
ways: (1) the possibility of a takeover encourages management to
act in the interests of the shareholders or the corporation as a
whole;3' and (2) most likely, a takeover would seek to remedy the
problems caused by unsuccessful incumbent management by
replacing it.3"

Because of these reasons, takeovers become an effective
mechanism for corporate governance. 8 Yet, that takeovers
themselves merely provide an external mechanism for corporate
governance and should be employed only as last resort, namely
after internal governance mechanisms have failed.39
On the other hand, many people doubt that takeovers provide
a natural remedy to corporate inefficiency. ' They point out that
takeovers do not always push corporations to improve
management.4 ' They believe that takeovers could encourage

31. Pinto, supra note 25, at 258.
32. Clyde E. Rankin, III, Unites States Corporate Governance: Implications for
Foreign Issuers, in TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 286,291
(Dennis Campbell ed., 2003) (noting that the SEC requires a statement of management
responsibilities and the S & P evaluates corporate governance of companies).
33. Id. at 266.
34. Pinto, supra note 25, at 258 (discussing the efficient capital market hypothesis);
Fischel, supra note 25, at 1.
35. Fischel, supra note 25, at 9.
36. See Pauline O'Sullivan, Governance by Exit. An Analysis of the Market for
Corporate Control, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ISSUES

122, 122-23 (Kevin Keasey, et al., eds. 1997); see also Pinto, supra note 25, at 273.
37. See O'Sullivan, supra note 36, at 122-23.
38. ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 662

(8th ed. 2003).
39. See O'Sullivan, supra note 36, at 122-23.
40. Hazen, supra note 18, at 182.
41. See id. at 182-83.
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corporate managers to focus on short-term performance, since the
"pressures from the financial markets often drive them to engage
in perverse behaviour that reduces long-term value".42 Particularly,
managers may make business decisions just to frustrate potential
takeovers. For example, company managers may try to make
themselves indispensable, and therefore, costly to replace. 3 In
addition, studies have shown that the shareholders of the bidder
company may be worse off after the takeover."
This further suggests that, to enhance the efficiency of the
securities market and its control function, it is necessary to
introduce regulatory mechanisms over the securities market and
securities business. Presently, the regulatory systems in developed
countries, particularly the countries of leading economies, are
based on longstanding practices, and thus are basically well
established."
Currently, the fundamental principle behind the securities
market regulations of most jurisdictions is disclosure.6 This
principle is based on the economic hypothesis that investors are
rational beings. If they possess relevant information, investors
could be in a position to make business decisions that are in their
best interest. Hence, disclosure of relevant information, relating to
specific securities and the issuers, is crucial. According to U.S.
Justice Louis Brandeis, disclosure is the most effective cure of the
social and industrial diseases, electric light the most efficient police
officer. 7 Enhancing their disclosure system requires much effort.
This includes improving reporting and auditing regulation and
practice and combating fraud, insider trading, and market
manipulation."
Fraud directly violates the principle of disclosure." Hence,
securities laws universally prohibit fraud. Insider trading upsets the
42. See MARGRET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 122 (1995).

43. O'Sullivan, supra note 36, at 125.
44. See also Hazen, supra note 18, at 191.
45.

See LIN YIE, SECURITIES LAW 56-64 (2000).

46. COX, ET AL., supra note 13, at 8.
47.

Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT

92 (1971) ("Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.").
48. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 24 at 769 (discussing fraud and duty to disclose);
see also HAZEN, supra note 20 at 418 (indicating a company's disclosure requirement in
self-interested transactions).
49. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 24, at 951-59.
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fairness of information disclosure and consequently damages the
integrity of the financial market. This is because market
participants should have equal access to the relevant information
from the company that issues the securities. Corporate insiders,
however, would have access to undisclosed confidential
information that affects the value of the company's securities."
They could seek to profit from the confidential information by
trading their securities based on this information. This creates
inequity among securities investors and also injures the company
and its shareholders because the insiders profit based upon
informational asymmetry.
Market manipulation is a special form of fraud." It is usually
an attempt to drive up a stock price on the secondary market by
creating demand for the stock through the dissemination of false
and misleading information." A number of strategies could be
exercised to achieve the purpose of market manipulation,
including pools, churning, runs, and short selling.
Because of the important role played by the securities market
in corporate development and corporate governance, countries
pay great attention to securities regulation. Some countries have
been trying to fully exploit the monitoring function of the
securities market in order to improve the governance of their
listed companies. 3 China is one of the countries that have
employed the supervisory functions of the securities market to
assist in corporatizing its state-owned enterprises and establishing
an effective governance system in its corporatized enterprises. 4
China has also endeavoured to develop a strong legal regime over
securities market and activities. In a span of ten years, China has
enacted a securities code and a number of regulations. 6

50. Insider trading in its origin refers to the corporate insider - the director, officer,
employee, or associate of the corporation. Now, in same systems, it extends to a tippee the person who deals in the securities on the basis of information provided to him or her
by a corporate insider. See BUTTERWORTHS BUSINESS AND LAW DICTIONARY 264, 265
(Hon. Justice Ipp et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002).
51. See COX, ET AL., supra note 13, at 691.
52. See BUTTERWORTHS, supra note 50, at 313.
53. Pinto, supra note 25, at 269-70 ; see also Alice de Jonge, CorporateGovernance in
a Cross-Border Environmnet: Overseas Listings of Chinese Firms, in TRENDS AND
DEVELOPMENTS INCORPORATE GOVERNANCE 91-93 (Dennis Campbell ed., 2003).
54. de Jonge, supranote 53, at 91-93.
55. Id. at 97.
56. Id.
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III. SECURITIES MARKET AND REGULATION IN CHINA

A. The Development of Securities Market in China
Before the 1950s, China had the largest stock market in Asia:
the Shanghai Stock Exchange.57 The People's Republic of China
("the PRC") was founded in 1949. In the following thirty years, the
main economic goal of the country was to establish a centrally
planned economy. As a result, by the end of the 1950s, stock
exchanges and securities markets, together with all types of private
ownership, were eliminated. 9
Nearly thirty years later, in 1981, the PRC revived its
securities activities. 6 By then, the PRC had already given up the
idea of a planned economy and initiated economic reforms aimed
at establishing a market economy throughout China."1 First, the
State Council issued national treasure bonds in 1981.62 Then in
1983, a Shenzhen company issued shares for the first time in the
PRC's history. 3 In 1984, Shanghai Feile Acoustics made the first
public share offering. In 1986, Shenyang opened the first over-thecounter market,6' which was authorized by the People's Bank of
China.6 ' Additionally, in December 1990, the People's Bank of

China authorized the establishment of two national stock
exchanges: the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange.' The two stock exchanges were defined as non-profit
legal entities. 7 From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, a number of
local stock exchanges and two national stock exchanges, Shanghai

57. See Jiangyu Wang, China'sSecurities Experiment: The Challenge of Globalization,
at http://www.eastlaw.net/researchlsecurities/securities-nol.htm (last accessed Nov. 12,
2005).
58. See CHANGJIANG LI, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S SECURITY
MARKET 28 (1998).

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
ZHU SANZHU, SECURITIES REGULATION IN CHINA 5 (2000).

Id. at 4-5.
See LI, supra note 58, at 31; I. A. TOKLEY & TINA RAVN, COMPANY AND
SECURITIES LAW IN CHINA 62 (1998).
63. See LI, supra note 58, at 53.
64. See LI, supra note 58, at 53.
65. See SANZHU, supra note 60, at 10 & n.29.
66. See Id. at 67.
67. Jiangyu Wang, China's Securities Experiment: the Challenge of the Globalization,
ch I, at http://www.eastlaw.net/research/securities/securities-intro.htm (last accessed Nov.
12, 2005).
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Different
and Shenzhen, started operating in China.'
organizations, including the People's Bank of China, the State
Council, the Ministry of Finance, and separate local governments
regulated these stock exchanges.69
Incidents relating to the operation of the stock exchanges,
particularly the 810 Incident on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in
1992, alerted the State Council to ambiguity in securities
regulation and administration."0 The State Council then clarified
the regulatory authority over the securities market by establishing
a specialized body to be the sole regulator of the securities
market.7 Consequently, by the end of that year, the State Council
established Zhipan, the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC).72 The State Council intended to create a single market
regulatory body. The influence, interests, and focus of this
regulatory body depended on the future development of the
securities market.7 3 But, there was strong resistance from all of the
other existing regulators." The People's Bank, the local
governments, and even the stock exchanges were not happy to
have the CSRC as their sole regulator.7 5 As a result, for four years,
the CSRC struggled to consolidate its authority, before eventually
obtaining full control over the stock exchanges and the securities
industry. 6
The first important step made by the CSRC was to gradually
strengthen its influence over the securities markets.7 During 1992
to 1993, the CSRC gained extended power of investigation and
68. SANZHU, supra note 60, at 7.
69. SANZHU, supranote 60, at 8-10.
70. The incident happened on August 10 and was named after the date - 810. On that
day, some 700,000 would be investors of a new issue packed into Shenzen to subscribe the
new issue. The prescribed five million subscription forms were used up within four hours.
Violent rioting resulted, as it was clear that the officials of the People's Bank of China
corrupted the process of handling subscription forms. The government restored order by
distributing another five million forms the next day. The incident, to a large extent, was
caused by the fact that too many organizations claimed authority over the operation of
securities market and activities. The situation was likely to cause confusion and
corruption. See CARL E. WALTER & FRASER J. T. HOWIE, PRIVATIZING CHINA: THE
STOCK MARKETS AND THEIR ROLE IN CORPORATE REFORM 30 (2003).

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

TOKLEY & RAVN, supra note 62, at 64.
Id.
See WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 70, at 9.
SANZHU, supra note 60, at 188-89.
See id.

76. Id. at 192.
77. See WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 70, at 9.
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enforcement.78 The next step, during 1996, was to assume full
control over the two national stock exchanges. 9 Since 1997, with
the exclusion of the People's Bank of China and local
governments' participation in the securities industry, the CSRC
has secured and retained its status as the single regulatory power
of the securities market and the securities industry in China." The
1999 Securities Law further clarified and affirmed the status and
powers of the CSRC as the sole regulatory authority of the
securities industry in China. The State Council directly overseas
the CSRC.'
B. Regulatory Framework of Securities Industry
In China, the legal framework of the securities industry has
developed in its own special social and historical environment.' In
other words, the evolution of securities regulation in China has
followed a unique path."3 In the beginning, a number of piecemeal
legal and administrative documents regulated stock exchanges.8
People hoped that the enactment of the Securities Law would
supersede most, if not all, of the piecemeal regulatory documents. 5
The 1999 Securities Law, however, has not truly lived up to its
promise. In China, the Securities Law regulates the issuing and
trading of shares, corporate bonds, and other such securities
lawfully recognized by the State Council.' The provisions of the
1994 Company Law and other laws and administrative regulations
cover those areas outside the reach of the securities law. 7 It seems
that the operation of some earlier documents shall apply.'
Nevertheless, the 1994 Company Law and the 1999 Securities Law
have substantially improved the earlier piecemeal situation by
78. See WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 70, at 9.
79. Id. at 9-10.
80. See id. at 10; Gao Xiqing, Some Regulatory Issues of the PRC Securities Market, in:
CHINA 2000: EMERGING INVESTMENT, FUNDING AND ADVISORY OPPORTUNITIES FOR
A NEW CHINA, ONLINEBOOKS, at http://www.asialaw.com/bookstore/china2000/

chapter0l.htm (Nov. 12, 2005).
81. See SECURITIES LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA arts. 7, 166
(P.R.C.), availableat http://www.csrc.gov.cn [hereinafter SECURITIES LAW].
82. SANZHU, supra note 60, at 8.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See id.
See TOKLEY & RAVN, supra note 62, at 66; SANZHU, supra note 60, at 207.
See SANZHU, supra note 60, at 13.
SECURITIES LAW, supra note 81, art. 2.
Id.
SANZHU, supra note 60, at 79-80.
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establishing a unified regulatory framework over China's securities
industry.89
Today, the sources of securities regulation include the
following:
" The 1994 Company Law provides provisions
governing the establishment and operation of stock
companies; it also sets provisions over the conduct of
companies operating on securities markets. For
example, it forbids the conduct of short-swing trading
and the conflicts of interest of company directors.'
* The 1999 Securities Law regulates the establishment
and operation of stock exchanges and brokering firms;
issuing and trading of securities; and securities
registration and clearing institutions.9 The. 1979
Criminal Code deals with corporate and securities
market offences.9'
" Special Regulations of the State Council; it is
noteworthy that the Securities Law only applies to the
issuing and trading of shares, bonds, and other
securities recognized by the State Council within
China. It applies neither to shares listed abroad, nor to
shares of Chinese companies reserved for foreign
investment. 3 Neither does the Securities Law apply to
government bonds. The State Council regulates the
above exempt securities.
* The 1997 Methods of Administrating Securities
Investment Funds are other relevant State Council
regulations.
* Ministry Rules refer to relevant administrative rules
and regulations over the securities industry; they were
enacted on behalf of some ministries and commissions,
including the CSRC, directly under control of the

89. Id. at 103.
90. Such regulations are mainly contained in COMPANY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, chs. 4, 5 (1994), available at http://www.cclaw.net/download/
companylaw.asp.
91. SECURITIES LAW, supra note 81, arts. 5-7.
92. Such provisions are mainly contained in CRIMINAL CODE OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, chs. 3, 4 (1979).
93. These refer to B shares, H shares, L shares and N shares. B, H, N, L shares are
RMB denominated shares, but should be purchased by foreign or domestic investors by
using foreign currency.
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State Council.
Finally, Self-Regulation, including rules of selfregulation made through the Articles of Association of
China Securities Association, business rules of the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, represent the
final set of relevant regulations."
By taking a close look at these regulations, one could see that
the Securities Law and the Company Law primarily regulate the
issuance of securities. These two laws also regulate shares and
stock companies. Furthermore, insider trading, market
manipulation, and disclosure are largely regulated by the
Securities Law.
It is interesting to note that a large part of the Chinese
Securities Law focuses on the establishment and operation of stock
exchanges,
stock
brokering
companies,
and
market
intermediaries." Because of this, Chinese Securities Law trespasses
upon the territory of Company Law.' Such an overlap seldom
occurs in the securities laws of western countries.97
The enactment of the Company Law in 1994 was a milestone
in China's enterprise reform.98 Notably, the Company Law
affirmed the policy of developing a market economy.' Since the
implementation of the law, China has experienced an
unprecedented wave of corporatization and privatisation.
However, ongoing corporate practice revealed some aspects
of inefficiency in the Company Law, even from the very beginning
of its enactment.'" Since the enactment of the Company Law in
1994, scholars and practitioners wanted to amend the Company
Law." ' This is because the Company Law leaves many gaps or
loopholes to be filled."° Many issues are not clearly addressed by
*

94. See XIANYI ZENG, SECURITIES LAW 26-28 (2000).
95. SECURITIEs LAW, supra note 81, arts. 5, 6.
96. Jiangyu Wang, China's Securities Experiment. The Challenge of Globalization,at
http://www.eastlaw.net/research/securities/sec2g.htm (last accessed Nov. 12, 2005).
97. Id.
98. Anna M. Han, China's Company Law: Practicing Capitalism in a Transitional
Economy, 5 PAc. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 457, 459 (1996).
99. SANZHU, supra note 60, at 88-89.
100. Han, supra note 98, at 460.
101. See Xiqing, supra note 80; see also Walter Hutchens, PRC Amends Company Law
and Securities Law, WalterHutchens.com (Aug. 30, 2004), at http://www.smith.umd.edu/
faculty/whutchens/2004/08/prc-amends-company-law-and-securities.html
102. SONJA OPPER, ET AL., THE POWER STRUCTURE IN CHINA'S LISTED
COMPANIES: THE COMPANY LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 26 (H.K. Institute of Econ.
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the Company Law, such as directors' fiduciary duties, classification
of shares, shareholders' derivative actions, and class actions."
Nevertheless, the Company Law 1994 has stood for ten years
without any significant amendments."9 Within those ten years,
China increased the role of the CSRC and reinforced securities
legislation. 5 Consequently, the CSRC has become very active in
effectively regulating listed companies to improve corporate
governance.
C. The Regulatory Activities of China Securities Regulatory
Commission over Corporate Governance
Since its establishment, the CSRC has been given an
increasingly active role in regulating the issuance and trade of
securities and the operation of stock exchanges."9 For example, the
CSRC enacted the Announcement of Prohibition of Market
Manipulation and the Provisional Rules of Prohibition of Entry
into the Securities Market. 7 In October 2003, the CSRC enacted
five more legal documents, including:
* The Disclosure Standard of Securities Companies
Issuing Shares to ParticularInvestors;'9°
* The Standard of Reports on Assessing the Credibility
and Ranks of Securities Companies;9
* The Standard of Application Form for Issuance of
Securities by Securities Companies; and"'
* The Standard of Prospectus of Securities Companies,
and the Standardof Announcement of Being Listed."'
Additionally, just one month before, on August 29, 2003, the
CSRC promulgated the ProvisionalMethods of Administrating the
and Bus. Strategy Working Paper No. 1039, 2002).
103. See Xiqing, supra note 80.
104.

Walter Hutchens, Major Revision to PRC Company Law Moving Forward,

Walter Hutchens' Blog (Feb. 25, 2005), at http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/faculty/whutchens/
2005/02/major-revision-to-prc-company-law.html.
105. See generally Han, supra note 98, at 457.
106. See Xiqing, supra note 80.
107. The Announcement of Prohibition of Market Manipulation was promulgated in
1996, and the Provisional Rules of Prohibition of Entry into the Securities Market was
promoted in 1997.
108. See
generally
http://gbcode.tdctrade.com/gb/my.tdctrade.com/airlaws/
index.asp?area=01&ct=08&st=0803 (last accessed Nov. 12, 2005).
109. See generally Id.
110. See generally Id.
111. See generally Id.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L Rev.

[Vol. 27:479

Securities of Securities Companies.2
The regulatory power of CSRC has trespassed into the
traditional territories of both the Company Law and Securities
Law."3 This is particularly true in the area of corporate
governance."' For instance, because the Company Law does not
provide detailed provisions on corporate governance, the CSRC
has endeavoured to fill this gap. In 2001, the CSRC produced the
Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of

Directors of Listed Companies."' Then in 2002, it promulgated the
Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies."6 Since July
2003, the CSRC has further required that at least one third of the
members of the board of directors be independent directors."7
Furthermore, the CSRC also organized training classes for
independent directors. 18
Furthermore, the CSRC stipulated detailed requirements for
shareholders' general meetings in listed companies."9 According to
the Suggestions on Regulating the General Meetings of Listed
Companies 2000, listed companies should lodge a report with the
stock exchanges to explain their reasons for not holding an annual
general meeting ,within the prescribed timeframe.' 2' This is
important because stock exchanges may delist a company that fails
to hold annual general meetings on time without a reasonable
excuse.'2' Thus, the CSRC further suggests that the board of
112. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, China Investment Banking & FinancialServices
Legal Alert, at http://www.freshfields.comlplaces/china/fsnews/pdfs/compendium.pdf (last
accessed Nov. 12, 2005).
113. Tong Lu, Corporate Governance in China, China Center for Corporate
Governance
8,
at
http://www.iwep.org.cn/cccg/pdf/Corporate %20Governance
%20in%20China%20% 20Prof.pdf (last accessed Nov. 12,2005).
114. Id. at 8-9.
115. China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, Code of Corporate Governancefor Listed Companies in
China
(Jan.
7,
2001)
at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/en/jsp/
detail.jsp?infoid=1061968722100&type=CMS.STD
(last accessed Nov. 12, 2005)
[hereinafter Code of Corporate Governance].
116. China Securities Regulatory Commission, Guidelinesfor IntroducingIndependent
Directors
to
the
Board
of
Directors
of
Listed
Companies
at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/en/jsp/detaii.jsp?infoid=1061947864100&type=CMS.STD
[hereinafter Guidelines].
117. Guidelines, supra note 116.
118. Lu, supra note 113 at 7.
119. Id. at 4.
120. See CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION, Suggestions on Regulating
the GeneralMeetings of Listed Companies,art. 3 (2000).
121. See CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION, Suggestions on Regulating
the General Meetings of Listed Companies, art. 3 (2000).
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directors invite securities lawyers to attend the general meetings
and publish their expert opinions on the validity of the procedures
of the meeting, and the qualifications of the attendees and
shareholders who called the meeting.1 22 It is also suggested that the
board may also invite public notaries to attend the meeting.23'
Apart from independent directors and the detailed
requirements on general meetings, the CSRC vigorously promoted
greater disclosure by listed companies. Listed companies are
required to publish Half-Yearly Reports

2'

and Annual Reports."

In addition to these periodical reports, listed companies must also
make continuous disclosure.'26 Whenever a major issue occurs, a
listed company must announce it publicly.1 2 ' The method of

disclosure is to publish information or documents in specified
newspapers, periodicals, and gazettes. In addition, information
should be made available for public inquiry at the company and
the stock exchange.'8 Recently, the CSRC has published a set of
five documents relating to disclosure.1 29 These documents provide

detailed requirements on the preparation of a prospectus and
expert report, and the standard of disclosure."'
The CSRC has the power to delist non-profitable or poorly
performing companies."' The CSRC may give the companies an
opportunity to improve their performance before delisting them.Y
In the meantime, the CSRC would give warnings to potential
investors in those companies.'33 In China, poorly performing or
non-profitable companies are formally labeled as either "PT
Companies" or "ST Companies."'"M PT means Particular Transfer,
which indicates that the companies have made losses in the past

122. Id. art. 3.
123. Id. art. 7.
124. SECURITIES LAW, supra note 81, art. 60.
125. Id. art. 61.
126. See id. art. 62.
127. Id.
128. Id. art. 64.
generally
http://gbcode.tdctrade.comlgb/my.tdctrade.com/airlaws/
129. See
index.asp?area=01&ct=08&st=0803 (last accessed Nov. 12, 2005).
130. Id.
131. Poor performers face delisting, at http://english.people.com.cn/english/200103/22/
eng20010322_65672.html (last updated Mar. 22, 2001).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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three consecutive years."' ST means Special Treatment, which
indicates that the companies have made losses in the past two
consecutive years.'36
In 2001, the CSRC and the State Economic and Trade
Commission jointly initiated a program inspecting the
establishment and development of a model corporate governance
system in listed companies."7 The aims of the inspection scheme
were to gain a clear understanding of the current situation of listed
companies in developing their modern corporate mechanisms, to
identify problems, and to propose effective solutions.' The
Chinese authorities expected that the program would further
promote the establishment of a modern corporate system in listed
companies, protect the rights of investors, and advance the healthy
development of the securities market. 9 The matters to be
inspected included:
" whether controlling shareholders influenced staff, or
financial arrangements;
* the appropriation of funds of listed companies by
controlling shareholders;
* whether controlling shareholders interfere in the
the
to
relating
processes
decision-making
appointments of directors, supervisors, managers, and
other senior officers, and the business affairs of the
listed companies;
* matters relevant to enterprise reforms;
* operation of the general meeting, the board of
directors and the supervisory board;
* the use of funds raised on the securities market;
and
4
* statements in periodical and interim reports.1'
The inspection took six months and was carried out in three
phases. The first phase was the Self-Inspection Phase that lasted
about two months. The second phase was the Emphasis Inspection
Phase. In this phase, the branches of the CSRC and the
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, Code of Corporate Governance at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/en (last accessed Nov. 12, 2005).
138. Id.
139. See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, Announcement of Carryingout the Inspection of the
Development of Modem Corporate System in Listed Companies 2002 at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/en (last accessed Nov. 12, 2005).
140. Id.
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Commission of Economy and Trade randomly selected some listed
companies as targets of inspection. And finally, the CSRC and the
Commission of Economy and Trade analyzed and concluded upon
the outcomes of the inspection.'
The Chinese Company Law and Securities Law do not grant
the right of class actions and provide investors with few civil
remedies. 42 Recently, the High Court of China ruled that investors
could sue the company or the directors of the company, if the
investigation of the CSRC found that there were fraudulent
activities."3 Now, some officials of the CSRC are calling for the
introduction of Class Actions.1"
From these discussions, one can see that the CSRC has been
playing an increasingly active role in promoting the practice of
sound corporate governance. Its important role in China's
corporate and securities systems deserves a closer look.
D. A Closer View of the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC)
It is interesting to note that the CSRC only has the status of a
ministry in China. ' At present, it does not exactly fit in the
description of a securities regulatory authority under securities
law. The wording in securities law implies that a securities
regulatory authority should not be a public institution, but only a
ministry or a commission under direct control of the State
Council. " However, in reality, the CSRC is clearly a public
institution."7
The CSRC is different from the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission (ASIC) and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in the United States. In Australia, the ASIC is
a government body and administers Australian corporations law. ' "
Under the supervision of the ASIC, the Australian Stock
141. Id.
142. See Wenhai Cai, Private Securities Litigation in China. Of Prominence and

Problems 13 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 135, 143-48 (1999).
143.
144.

Susan V. Lawrence, Ally of the People, FARE. ECON. REV., May 9, 2002, at 26.
Bei Hu, China Urged to Adopt Class Action Suits, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov.

21, 2002, at 1.
145. China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, About Us, at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/en/
homepage/about-en.jsp (last accessed Nov. 12, 2005).
146. See SECURITIES LAW, supra note 81, at 210.
147. Id. art. 172.
148. Australian Sec. and Inv. Comm'n (ASIC), ASIC at a Glance, at
http://www.asc.gov.au (last accessed Nov. 12, 2005); ASIC, The Laws ASIC Administers, at
http://www.asc.gov.au (last accessed Nov. 12, 2005).
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Exchange produces its own listing and business rules."9 If there is a
breach, the stock exchange itself decides whether to delist a
company.'50 In the United States, the SEC administers the stock
exchanges, has authority to administer and supervise securities
activities in that country, and is given extended power of
investigation.' Under the administration and supervision of the
SEC, stock exchanges, clearing houses and the National
Association of Securities Dealers also make their own rules of selfregulation.'52
In China, however, the CSRC deals with the market more
directly.'53 For instance, it retains the power of delisting poorly
performing companies and it stipulates detailed requirements on
general meetings and disclosure."' In a sense, its regulatory power
may have eroded some traditional territory of the Company Code
and Securities Code, as well as some territory of self-regulation of
the stock exchanges.
There are basically three types of securities regulatory
practice. The first type is the Australian model discussed above.
The second type of securities regulatory practice is the U.S. style,
with a centralized regulatory authority (the SEC) with extensive
power of administration and regulation over securities activities
and operation of stock exchanges."' The third type of securities
regulatory practice we shall look at is the German style. In
Germany, banks play an important role in regulating securities
activities."' Banks are members of stock exchanges, essentially
monopolizing the stock broking business'57 and underwrite most

149. See Alan Shaw & Paul von Nessen, The Legal Role of-the Australian Securities
Commission and the Australian Stock Exchange, in SECURITIES REGULATION IN
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 163-85 (Gordon Walker ed., 1998).
150. Id. at 188.
151. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (SEC), The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC
at
Integrity,
Market
Maintains
and
Investors
Protects
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last accessed Nov. 12, 2005).
152. Id.
153. See SANZHU, supra note 60, at 51 (2000).
154. See id. at 51-52,192.
155. See Generally, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Investor's Advocate:
How the SEC Protects Investors and Maintains Market Integrity, at
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last updated Aug. 19, 2005).
156. See YUWA WEI, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A CHINESE
PERSPECTIVE 142 (2003).
157. See Brian R. Cheffins, Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United
States and Germany at the Turn of the 20th Century, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 473, 498 (2003).
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securities issued by companies.'58 Consequently, Germany has
comparatively relaxed rules of disclosure.'59 As sophisticated
investors, banks have the means and skills to obtain necessary
commercial information."
China presents a different type of securities regulatory
practice from those three classic types. In the past decade, China
persistently strengthened the power of the CSRC. 6' Based on this,
many may believe that the country is going in the direction of the
U.S. style of corporate governance by building a strong securities
regulatory regime. China's situation, however, is not exactly the
same as that of the United States. Historically, the reason for a
strengthened securities regime in the United States is that the
states pre-empted the regulatory power over corporations."62
Building a robust securities legal regime is an effective strategy of
federal control over U.S. corporate and securities systems." China,
on the other hand, is motivated by contrasting factors regarding
promotion of the securities market and securities regulation.
The introduction of modern corporate mechanisms into the
Chinese enterprise system is the essential component of the
economic reform package. As mentioned above, since 1996, the
pace of corporatization in China has accelerated. An important
objective of the Chinese authority is to encourage companies to be
listed on the securities market, thus putting companies under the
supervision of the market.' In doing so, the authority hopes that
the process of establishing a modern corporate governance system
in these enterprises can be sped up.'65 In this sense, the CSRC acts
as a separate leverage for accelerating enterprise reform in China.
The CSRC has aggressively promoted sound corporate

158. See id.
159. See Anupama J. Naidu, Was Its Bite Worse Than Its Bark? The Costs SarbanesOxley Imposes on German Issuers May Translate into Costs to the United States, 18
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 271, 282 (2004).
160. See id. at 282 n. 75.
161. See SANZHU, supranote 60, at 8-9.
162. See WEI, supra note 156, at 134-35.
163. See id. at 135.
164. See generally Tong Lu, Corporate Governance in China, China Center for
Corporate
Governance
8,
at
http://www.iwep.org.cn/cccg/pdf/
Corporate%20Governance%20in%20China%20%2OProf.pdf
(last accessed Nov. 12,
2005).
165. See generally WU ZHIPAN & BAI JIANJUN, LAW AND PRACTICE OF SECURITIES
TRANSACTION I-VIII (2000) (hereinafterLAW AND PRACTICE).
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governance that assists Chinese companies to withstand scrutiny.'6
The CSRC developed in China's special social and economic
context which has tightly linked the development of the CSRC to
China's enterprise reform.'67
Hence, the CSRC plays an extremely important and special
role in China's enterprise reform. It is expected to continue to
vigorously bring changes and improvement to China's corporate
and securities systems. The CSRC Vice Chairperson, Laura Cha,
pronounced: "For our part, the CSRC is committed to be a proactive regulator in fostering corporate governance, in enforcing
our rules, in safeguarding the integrity 68 of our markets, and in
championing the rights of our investors.'

The current development of the securities legal regime and
the securities' regulatory authority in China suggests that the
status of the CSRC as the centralized and powerful regulatory and
administrative authority over the securities market is firmly
established. How far it will go in that direction remains to be seen.
The activities pursued by the CSRC brought and will inevitably
bring further significant influence to the law and practice of
corporations and securities in China.
IV. THE FUTURE
A. Markets Have To Be Regulated by Market Rules
China's securities practice emerged from the economic
reforms of the 1980s.'69 By 2000, the Shanghai Stock Exchange was
one of the best performing houses in the world.' In general, the
Chinese capital market fared reasonably well before the plunge of
July 2001."' The situation went from bad to worse. The
government plans of raising social securities funds have been
166. See generally CSRC, Corporate Governance, at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/
cn/jsp/third.jsp?path=ROOT%3ECN%3EB7%A8%C2%C9%B7%A8%B9%E6%3E
%B2%BF%C3%C5%B9%E6%D5%C2%3E%B9%AB%CB%BE%BC%EO%B9%D
C (last accessed Nov. 12, 2005).
167. See generally Id.
168. Laura M. Cha, The Future of China's Capital Markets and the Role of Corporate
Governance, Luncheon Speech at China Business Summit (April 18, 2001), at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/en/jsp/detail.jsp?infoid=1061948105100&type=CMS.STD.
169. See CHANGJIANG LI, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S SECURITY
MARKET 28 (1998).
170. See CHEN QINGBO, SECURITIES ENGLISH 148 (2003).
171. See DEHUAN, supra note 3, at 6.
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under threat, and many private companies have been adversely
affected."'
By September 2001, the trading value of the Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges accounted for 51.26 % of GDP.'73
Unlike the developed markets, however, the Chinese capital
market fluctuates irregularly, and the volatility of the market
follows a drastic pattern. From 1990 to mid-2001, the Chinese
securities market soared to an historic high followed by several
periods of a flat market. 74 Since July 2001, the market could be
classified as a bear market. 75'
In the past, the Chinese government produced a number of
interventional strategies to control the flux on the securities
market and to avoid crises that could devastate the market as a
whole. When the market soared to an unprecedented high, the
government suspended the issuance and trade of new shares to
prevent the formation of an investment bubble. 76 Adjusting
financial policies was another way of intervening in the securities
market.' For example, in 1996, the government cut the interest
rate twice and the market reacted positively.' 8 It was estimated
that around ¥500 million flowed into the securities market as the
result of interest rate reductions. 9
The government also tried to use the media to cool down an
overheated market. This was successful in some cases, but not
always. For instance, in 1994, the market skyrocketed.'80 The
government sensed the danger of a market crash and released a
large quantity of news in the press to warn investors.'8 ' Investors,
however, did not react to the warning and share prices continued
to soar.'1 Eventually, the market crashed spectacularly, dropping
70% from its peak." Such a sharp fall had rarely been seen in the
http://www.sse.com.cn/
172. See the Shangzheng fluctuation history, at
sseportal/ps/zhs/ggxx/zsjbxx.jsp?indexName=&indexCode=000010 (last updated Jun. 18,
2002).
173. See DEHUAN, supra note 3, at 4.
174. See supra 172.
175. See Id.
176. See CHEN, supra note 1, at 118.
177. See CHEN, supra note 1, at 154.
178. Id., at 154.
179. Id. at 154.
180. See Id. at 118,138.
181. See ld. at 138.
182. See Id. at 118.
183. Id.
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modern world." In contrast, the Chinese government successfully
intervened the feverish speculation in shares of Shenzhen
Development Bank (SDB) through the media in 1996.185
Since mid-1996, the wild trade in shares of SDB catalyzed a
bull market in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 86'
Concerned about the ultimate outcome, the government decided
to intervene and issued a warning through a "special
correspondent" in a People's Daily editorial on December 16."
Due to the political status of People's Daily and the historically
significant role played by such an editorial to China's political and
economic life, not many investors could afford to ignore the
message conveyed in the editorial." Within three weeks, the
Shezhen market was down 30% .
Generally speaking, government intervention was an effective
means of control over the volatility of China's securities market in
the 1990s. It seems, however, that government intervention is less
likely to achieve the goal of control in China today. Since the bear
market started in 2003, Chinese authorities have sought to control
the fall in the market. 9 ' But intervention has proved to have little
effect."' For example, one strategy adopted was to limit the size of
new offerings."l A listing application would not be approved if the
company sought to sell shares at a price of more than twenty times
its earnings.'93 The strategy proved to be unsuccessful. Reports
found that many well-performing companies decided not to issue
new shares and a significant number of promising private
companies moved to Hong Kong, as its market looked more
attractive."'
This suggests that it is time for the Chinese to work through
the problems in the securities market and find solutions to
improve market performance. At present, the main problems in
the securities business include undue government intervention,

184. See generally Id.
185.

Id. at 163.

186. See generally CHEN, supra note 1, at 163.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See CHEN, supra note 1, at 162-164.
See WALTER & HOWIE, supranote 70, at 212.
See id. at 212; see also CHEN, supra note 1, at 161-163.
See generally Wei, supra note 156.

Id.
Id.
See DEHUAN, supra note 3, at 4.
See Id. at 149.
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lack of regulatory leverage, and poor corporate governance." '
Excessive government interference is a proven problem that
burdens the securities business in China. 96 Theoretically, China's
system of control over the securities market and its transactions
has become a combination of governmental supervision and selfregulation in the securities markets. In practice, governmental
supervision is the paramount influence.'" Consequently, the selfregulatory function of the stock exchanges remains marginal. "'For
example, currently, the authority to investigate misconduct of
listed companies is given to the government body, the CSRC, not
the stock exchanges.' As a result, the stock exchanges are unable
to swiftly impose liability on companies that have uttered
misstatements.200
Furthermore, the supervisory functions of the CSRC and the
stock exchanges are not clearly divided. The CSRC, in practice,
has considerable power to intervene in the securities market and
its transactions.0 ' Moreover, to be eligible to be listed on a stock
exchange, a company must obtain approval from the CSRC. 0° In
other words, a stock exchange does not have the final say relating
to whether a company should be admitted into the stock exchange.
Nevertheless, the stock exchanges provide listing requirements,
and companies have to meet these requirements to qualify to trade
on their stock exchanges.
The stock exchanges are closer to the securities market than
any government body could be, and are better placed to receive
market information. Hence, it is desirable to fully implement a
self-regulatory capacity within China's stock exchanges.
Furthermore, the self-regulation approach is more acceptable and
business friendly to listed companies. In short, China needs to
determine how to enhance the self-regulatory function of its stock
195. See Id. at 200-203.
196. Id. at 201.
197. Id. at 201.
198. Id. at 201.
199. Id. at 201.
200. Id. at 201.
201. Id.
202. See SECURITIES LAW, supra note 81, art. 10 ("Public offers of securities shall meet
the conditions prescribed in laws and administrative regulations and shall, in accordance
with law, be reported to the securities regulatory authority under the State Council or the
department authorized by the State Council for verification or examination and approval.
No unit or individual may make a public offer of securities if the same has not been
verified or examined and approved according to law.").
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exchanges.
The lack of efficient regulation over the securities market and
business is another serious problem that is hindering the healthy
development of the securities market. 3 China does not have
detailed legislation regulating securities transactions, protecting
investors and supervising securities services. The current Securities
Law provides general principles relating to securities markets and
transactions, but it leaves many issues to be remedied. These
loopholes still allow dealings on the market and increase
difficulties in enforcing the Securities Law and other regulations.
For example, the Securities Law does not provide civil remedies
that could be made available to victims of insider trading.2' It only
provides that the insider may receive a fine or face imprisonment,
and that illegal profits are to be confiscated. 5 Regarding
disclosure, the law states that a company has the duty to make
complete and actual disclosure. ' It seems, however, that the law
neglects to require companies to make timely disclosuredisclosure within a prescribed time.' Because of gaps in
legislation, market misconduct is still not dealt with efficiently.'
Efforts need to be made to further complete the securities
legislation.
It is noteworthy that in China, many incidents of market
misconduct are connected to poor corporate governance. The
volatility of the securities market is frequently associated with
corporate governance problems." This distinguishes the Chinese
securities market from more mature markets. Many listed Chinese
companies still experience insider control problems. 10 China,
insider control problems usually result from the shareholding
structure in its state-controlled listed companies. " Most listed
companies are corporatized, state-owned, or controlled enterprises
with the state being the dominant shareholder. 2 Minority

203. See CHEN, supra note 1, at 138, 199.
See SECURITIES LAW, supra note 81, art. 183.
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205.
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shareholders in those companies do not have the power to change
the management nor the boards."3 The state, as the dominant
shareholder, has to rely on its agents to exercise its shareholders'
rights."' The directors of these companies are appointed by the
relevant authorities or state agents.215 There are opportunities for
directors to entrench themselves in their positions and make
themselves de facto owners of the companies."6 As insiders, once
they seize control of the company, they may pursue private goals
other than maximizing shareholders' interests. For example,
insiders may excessively increase their remuneration and other
private benefits without fear of intervention from other
shareholders. Moreover, members of the supervisory board in such
companies are also insiders."7 Such a supervisory board cannot
efficiently exercise supervision over its management. In many
cases, poor corporate governance can lead to misconduct on the
securities market, and insider trading has become the typical
example." 8 Insiders deal with the securities of their own companies
based on undisclosed, price sensitive information, or supply the
information to other parties.
Recent years have seen the emergence of a few privately
owned and listed companies in China." Such companies are
usually in the hands of a single individual or family. In such a
company, the dominant shareholder may obtain excessive personal
profit by exploiting minority shareholders." It appears that both
state-controlled companies and individual or family-controlled
companies have trouble in adhering to the ethical practice of
corporate governance. 1 Improving corporate governance of listed
companies has become the Chinese government's most imperative
task in business.
China has much to do to improve its securities practice and
regulation. Thus, its securities system is still in the process of
development. How China will shape its securities regime is an
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 217.
at
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generally
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issue stimulating much interest.
Different jurisdictions have adopted different systems of
securities regulation. The divergence of securities regulation and
practices illustrates that different social, political, economic, and
historical environments foster different systems of securities'
regulation and practice, suitable to the specific circumstances.
Some differences merely lie in technical divergences. Experiences
under the different systems provide valuable resources for the
Chinese to use for reference in order to find their own path of
developing an efficient fund-raising mechanism for their newly
corporatized state-owned enterprises and their fledgling private
enterprises. At the moment, some people conjecture that China is
following suit with the United States, while others predict that the
German-Japanese bank-based model will finally be accepted by
the Chinese.
B. Will China Follow the U.S. Path?
Current U.S. regulation of the securities market can be traced
to ancient England.222 However, in modern days, the UK securities
market is not the largest.223 The privilege of maintaining the largest
securities market and the most influential securities regulatory
regime is claimed by the United States. 24
Current securities regulation in the United States is the result
of long-term development and painful experience. 5 In the
beginning, the U.S. securities market was not adequately
regulated. " After World War I, huge amounts of money were
being pumped into the securities market.2 Consequently, share
prices were pushed to an historical high and created a "bubble" in
securities investment." The bubble burst, numerous corporations
collapsed, and the whole country slipped into economic
depression.29 The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
222. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 24, at 1.
223. Amir Licht, David's Dilemma: A Case Study of Securities Regulation in a Small
Open Market, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 673, 684 (2001).
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Exchange Act of 1934 were enacted primarily to bring activities on
the securities market under close control.23
The Securities Act of 1933 focuses markedly on public
distribution of securities. It requires companies to disclose
necessary information when issuing securities to the public. The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gives the SEC power to regulate
all aspects of the securities industry, as well as to investigate and
punish illegal dealings. 3 It regulates insiders' transactions in
securities, proxy solicitations, and tender offers; provides antifraud provisions; and prohibits manipulation in securities
dealings.
One of the most distinctive features of U.S. securities
regulation is the development of rigorous securities laws and
rules.2 35 The securities market and its transactions are under close
regulatory surveillance 6 and a strong legal regime, separate from
the Corporations Code, exists over securities.237 Historically, the
power of making corporations law has been entrenched in state
jurisdictions due to constitutional implications. 8 In efforts to
attract more corporations to their own states, the states initially
raced to produce more relaxed rules for corporate operation in
their jurisdictions.329' The federal attempt at securities regulation
followed. 20 The question for the states was whether they were
willing to impose stringent securities regulation on corporations in
their jurisdiction at the risk of driving corporations to incorporate
elsewhere.2 1 For regulating securities effectively, it was necessary
to establish a strong securities regulatory regime at the federal

230. See SEC,
The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, at
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last accessed Nov. 12, 2005).
231. See DAVID L. RATNER & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION IN A
NUTSHELL 34 (2002).
232. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78111 (2004); see also SEC, supra note 230.
233. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2004).
234. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2004).
235. See ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 39 (1976).
236. Id. at 42.
237. Id. at 46.
238. Id. at 22, 41-42.
239. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558-59 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting
that "[c]ompanies were early formed to provide charters for corporations in states where
the cost was lowest and the laws least restrictive. The states joined in advertising their
wares. The race was one not of diligence but of laxity.").
240. CONARD, supra note 235, at 22.
241. See id. at 42.
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level.2 ' Accordingly, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 became federal law.
The spirit of U.S. securities laws is disclosure. 3 The Securities
Act of 1933 requires the issuer of securities to timely file a
registration statement with the SEC before issuing new
securities. 2" Disclosure is made by including relevant statements in
the prospectus and registering those statements with the SEC."
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires periodical reports
from the issuers, 6 as well as requiring the issuing companies to file
a statement disclosing their shareholdings."
Another distinctive aspect of U.S. securities regulation is that
it established an efficient, hierarchical system of regulatory
bodies.21 8 At the apex of the regulatory system is the SEC, the
administrator of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and five other securities statutes.24 9 The
SEC is an administrative agent of the U.S. government and has
legislative, executive, and judicial functions. " It has the power to
enact rules and regulations for implementing the securities laws,
including the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934." It enforces securities laws and regulations,
investigates violation of the laws and regulations, and pursues legal
actions against violators. 2 Beneath the SEC are the self-regulation
bodies including stock exchanges and the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc." The base of the regulatory hierarchy
comprises the supervisory bodies of listed companies.' Hence, the
United States adopted a regulatory system of central
administration based on the self-regulation groundwork.
The U.S. influence can be found everywhere in China's
securities system and legislation. China has established a U.S. style
242. Id.
243. MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 1 (2nd ed. 1996).
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regulatory regime over its securities system. 5 Like the United
States, the Chinese securities regulations are provided in a
separate code, which models the U.S. securities law in many
aspects." It emphasizes transparency and prevention of market
manipulation and forbids the involvement of commercial banks in
securities investments. 7 China also established a concentrated
regulatory and administrative system over securities markets and
business, which resembles the U.S. regulatory system. The CSRC's
functions are similar to those of the SEC. 8 In addition, the
Chinese are calling for further importation of the U.S. experience
in areas of disclosure, investor protection, and regulating securities
companies. 9
Nevertheless, it is too early to say that a U.S. style securities
system will take root in China, because significant differences exist
in the corporate systems of the two countries. In China, the most
important and well-performing companies remain wholly owned
by the state, and their shares are not tradable on the stock
exchanges.' ° These companies rely substantially on state banks for
finance.26 ' Conversely, the largest U.S. companies are all listed
public companies. Large Chinese companies usually have the state
as the dominant shareholder, while large U.S. companies have
dispersed shareholdings. Furthermore, in China, not all shares are
freely transferable.2 2 State shares and legal person shares are only
255. When drafting the Securities Law, China's legislators closely studied U.S.,
Japanese, and Taiwanese legislation, and drew inspiration from their experiences.
Japanese and Taiwanese securities laws are all substantially influenced by U.S. legislation.
See generally Zhipan Wu, Seeing the Designation of the Administrative System of Securities
Business Through the Definition of Securities, in LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 165, at 4;
see also Bing Peng, The US Experience in Regulating Conflicts of Interests of Stock
Brokers, in LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 165, at 119.
256. Id.
257. Since 1995, the United States has relaxed the rules that forbid banks' involvement
in securities investments. Japan has followed suit.
258. See Chao Wang, Redesigning China's Regulatory System over Securities Business
in Law, in LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 165, at 35.
259. See generally ZHENZHONG HUANG, CIVIL LITIGATION AND REMEDIES IN US
SECURITIES LEGISLATION (2003); See generally SHENG XUEJUN, RESEARCH ON
DISCLOSURE SYSTEM IN SECURITIES BUSINESS (2004); see also Yang Liang, A
Comparisonof the Regulatory Systems of the CapitalAdequacy of Securities Companies, in
LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 256 at 143-164.
260. See How Large is China's Private Sector? at http://www.flonnet.com/
fl2221/stories/20051021001708700.htm (last updated Oct. 08,2005).
261. See WEI, supra note 156, at 142.
262. Han Zhiguo, The Mechanisms of Development and Innovation of China's
CorporateEconomy, 1 SEC. L. REV 320 (2001).
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allowed to be transferred among state-owned companies or legal
persons. 263They are not tradable on the securities market."4 As a
result, only 34.13% of
the total issued shares are freely tradable on
26
the securities market.
China's current situation of corporate development, and its
policy of keeping important trades and companies under state
control, suggest that the country's aspiration to develop a U.S.
style securities market is constricted by its social, political, and
economic systems. It may, therefore, be more desirable for China
to promote the role of its banks in corporate finance at the present
stage, and to gradually carry out the transition from a bank-based
system to a U.S. style market-based system.
C. Can any Inspiration be Drawn From the German Experience?
In Germany, it is not a popular practice for companies to raise
funds by issuing securities on the securities market." Historically,
German banks have been the main source of corporate finance in
the country. 7 Banks charge a low interest rate on bank loans66 and
usually underwrite the shares of companies. 9 Consequently,
Germany has a less active securities market and fewer listed
companies than both the United States and the United Kingdom."
Historically, debentures were subject to double taxation.
Shareholders had to pay tax on the dividends they received, after
the companies had been taxed on the profits out of which the
dividends had been paid. 7 Loan interest, however, was not doubly
taxed.2 7 The interest income from bank accounts are taxed at a
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rate much lower than the dividend income. As a result, many
investors chose to deposit their money in a bank, rather than
invest in securities.273 This was also an important factor which
negatively affected the vitality of the securities market in
Germany.274 The German experience is in contrast with other
major modern economic regimes such as the United States and275the
United Kingdom, but similar to the Japanese financial system.
At a time when nations are fiercely competing for capital
investment, Germany has gradually shown interest in the idea of
enhancing the function of the securities market in corporate
development. 6 Since the 1970s, Germany reduced the tax rate on
dividends 77 and took important 278steps to establish U.S. style
regulation of the securities market.
In China, some scholars are reflecting on the benefit of
promoting a banks-based financial system or a hybrid system that
combines the strengths of banks and markets. 9 Presently, Chinese
banks are prohibited from engaging in speculative activities." ° The
reasons behind the policy mainly include:
0 First, to protect the customers of banks.' If banks
'were allowed to participate in stock market activities,
they would be likely to invest in high risk and high
return businesses. With funds locked in such
investments, banks might be unable to prerform their
primary function of repaying principal and interest on
time. In addition, when the companies in which the
banks hold shares or other securities experience
difficulties, the depositors would likely withdraw their
money from the banks, worried that the banks could
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Universal Banking System, 6 EUR. REV. OF ECON. HIST. 221, 252 (2002).
275. See generally YIE, supra note 45, at 62-64.
276. See VITOLS, supra note 271, at 18.
277. Francene M. Augustyn, A Primerfor IncorporatingUnder the Income Tax Laws
of France,Germany, or the United Kingdom, 7 NW. J. INT'L. L. & BUS. 267, 281 (1985).
278. See VITOLS,supra note 271, at 12.
279. See, e.g., Amy Wu, PRC's Commercial Banking System: Is Universal Banking a
Better Model?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 623, 633 (1999).
280. See COMMERCIAL BANKING LAW, art. 43 (1995) (P.R.C.), reprintedin ASIA LAW
& PRACTICE, COMMERCIAL BANKING LAW IN THE PRC: ESTABLISHING A FOREIGN
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be affected negatively. This would, in turn, trigger a
series of crises. For the purpose of protecting the
depositors of banks, it is necessary to separate banks
from the securities market;
" Second, to avoid amplification of risks." Banks are
likely to rescue poorly performing companies in which
they themselves hold securities by continuing to
purchase the securities of these companies, in order to
avoid losses. Or the banks may want to help out the
companies by making loans to them. Such decisions
would not be made in the best interests, of the
depositors. Furthermore, such actions of the banks
would increase the risk to investments; and
* Third, to avoid the banks' conflicts of interests.
When banks perceive difficulty of assisting the
companies by taking further securities, they may
encourage their customers to purchase securities of the
companies in which the banks themselves hold
securities. Such behavior could shatter public
confidence in banks.
On the other hand, many in China see the benefits of banks'
involvement in the securities business and in corporate finance
generally. Some point out that the advantages of including banks
in the securities business definitely outweigh the disadvantages .2"
Forbidding banks to participate in securities activities is a very
expensive method of avoiding the risks that banks' participation
could bring to securities business." An absolute restriction of
banks' involvement in securities business would bring economic
inefficiency." Cheaper methods should be used to avoid or
mitigate such risks. Bank participation in securities activities can
reduce costs of services and encourage competition. When banks
strategically invest their money in different trades and companies,
their ability to withstand risks is actually strengthened. 7 Most
importantly, bank participation in the securities business would

282. Id. at 50-51.
283. Id. at 50.
284. Id. at 72.
285. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 279, at 630.
286. Pan Pan, supra note 281, at 72.
287. Art Alcausin Hall, InternationalBanking Regulation into the 21st Century: Flirting
with Revolution, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 41, 74 (2001).

2005]

Securities Market & Regulation in China

enhance competitive capacity of China's enterprises in the
international market.
Since China's entry into the WTO, Chinese enterprises and
financial institutions have been further exposed to international
competition." Chinese banks should play a more strategic role in
supporting national enterprises and protecting national industries.
In the meantime, Chinese banks face challenges from foreign
banks.289 Further restricting Chinese banks' business activities
could do them more harm than good. Therefore, the German
experience of establishing a bank-based financial system and
gradually introducing market factors does seem a useful reference
for the Chinese.
V. CONCLUSION

The development of the securities market in China has been
driven by two primary purposes: first, to utilize domestic savings to
facilitate social funds and private companies; and second, to
establish a modem Corporate Governance System in the listed
companies.
Significant achievement has been made. Within ten years,
China established two national stock exchanges, enacted the
Securities Law and a number of relevant regulations, and founded
the administrative body, the CSRC. By 2000, over 1,000 Chinese
companies were listed on domestic stock exchanges.' The total
amount of capital traded on the two national exchanges accounted
for 50% of China's GDP.
Despite these achievements, the development of the Chinese
securities business has also unearthed some serious regulatory and
practical problems, inherent in the securities business in China.
The accumulation of those problems has markedly contributed to
the current stock market slump. It is time for the Chinese to think
purposefully and plan the future development of the securities
market carefully. First of all, China has to answer the question:
should China follow the U.S. model by developing a sophisticated
securities market as the main resource of corporate finance? It
seems that Chinese securities law and practice have been
288. China'sResource Bid, Editorial, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 22, 2004, at A18.
289. Brian Kelleher, Foreign Banks Target China, AUSTRALIAN BANKING &
Nov. 17, 2004, at 2.
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substantially influenced by U.S. laws and practice. Yet, in the
process of building a modern corporate system and a financial
system, China has faced different social, political, and economic
challenges and has followed its own path of development. China's
particular social, political, and economic situations suggest that
China may not wholeheartedly embrace a U.S. style of corporate
financial system and securities regulatory regime. At the current
stage of development, it may be more desirable that China develop
a financial system that combines the strengths of the market-based
approach and the bank-based approach.
To ensure that the securities market becomes a fair and
reasonable trading place for investors, the Chinese government
does need to reduce direct governmental intervention to allow the
market to operate under market rules. Efforts should also be made
to improve the current Securities Law and corporate governance
of listed companies. It is interesting to note that China expected its
securities market to promote sound practice of corporate
governance in listed companies, to help it speed up the
establishment of a modern corporate governance system. It
appears that this does not necessarily follow in such a unilateral
way. The evidence from modern economies is that a wellfunctioning securities market and a sound system of corporate
governance are mutually dependent: the development of the
securities market provides an external monitoring mechanism of
corporate governance, and good practice of corporate governance
does, in turn, ensure the orderly operation of the securities market.
To build a modern corporate governance system, however, China
needs to make further efforts to rationalize the shareholding
structure in its companies. It needs to curtail inside control and
improve its securities regulation.

